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Legal histories of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era tend to focus inordinately 
on economic regulation within a doctrinal framework in which private rights, equal 
protection, and “substantive” due process guided judicial decision-making. Consequently, 
the overarching economic context in prevailing legal historiography obscures an 
important yet oft-overlooked development in the linkage between public rights, natural 
resource trusteeship, and the early-twentieth-century environmental conservation 
movement. This development is inextricably tied to the evolution of water law in the late 
nineteenth century and the expansion of the American commercial republic. A normative 
understanding of public water rights during this period is confined to an economic 
framework in which water functioned either as a highway for commerce or as a source of 
power.  
This article argues that the 1908 Supreme Court decision in Hudson County Water 
Co. v. McCarter, in a departure from economic instrumentalism, inaugurated a novel 
reconceptualization of water as a natural resource in and of itself. The legal principles on 
which Hudson County rested—the sanctity of the broad interests and welfare of the 
people with regard to public waters—had been firmly established by 1908. However, the 
public interest and public rights in water were inherently economic; no doctrinal or legal 
interpretations of water prior to Hudson County recognized public waters in broad and 
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unconditional language that transcended economic pretexts. Furthermore, Hudson County 
signifies the confluence of three distinct historical currents: the development of a robust 
judicial public trust doctrine, the emergence of environmental conservation as a social 
and political imperative, and the beginning of a progressive shift in American 
constitutional jurisprudence. Each of these three strands was essential to the legal 
transcendence of water as a natural resource during the Progressive Era. 
This reinterpretation of Hudson County places it within existing interpretive 
models of legal history as more of a paradigmatic signpost than any sort of abrupt 
intervention. Hudson County thus stands as a progressive antecedent to the later era of 








Teddy Roosevelt recounted in his 1913 autobiography that, prior to his 
administration, America’s “public resources were being handled and disposed of in 
accordance with the small considerations of petty legal formalities, instead of for the 
large purposes of constructive development.” Echoing the great refrains of the 
Progressive Era, Roosevelt attributed the situation to widespread tendencies in 
governments at all levels to bend to the private interests of American corporations. He 
further maintained that America’s “magnificent river system, with its superb possibilities 
for public usefulness,” had been mismanaged and unduly influenced by special interests.1 
Roosevelt’s critical comments on corporate interests and laissez-faire governance 
through the turn of the century are representative of contemporary popular perceptions. 
Roosevelt, the champion of progressive reform, would almost certainly have been aware 
of these perceptions and perhaps drew upon them in an effort to inflate the heroic 
accomplishments of his previous administration on the heels of a presidential election 
defeat and Republican Party crisis in 1912. Moreover, Roosevelt—whose sole Supreme 
Court nominee, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, remained on the Supreme Court bench 
until 1932—must have been keenly aware of critical perceptions of the much-maligned 
Supreme Court. Popular criticism of the court in these years of the Progressive Era 
generally contended that “judicial power was being used to thwart the will of the people 
and to advance the interests of the propertied classes.”2  
 
1 Theodore Roosevelt: An Autobiography (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1925), 
395. 
2 Owen Fiss, Troubled Beginnings of the Modern State, vol. 8 of The Oliver Wendell 
Holmes Devise: History of the Supreme Court of the United States, ed. Stanley N. Katz (New 




Legal historians have come to refer to this period as the Lochner era for its 
eponymous 1905 working hours case Lochner v. New York, in which Justice Holmes 
issued a curt dissenting opinion that famously denounced his fellow justices for 
embracing laissez-faire “economic theory.”3 Owen Fiss has remarked that Holmes’s 
dissent “provided the progressives with a critique of the Court from within,” and later 
critiques from contemporary scholars such as Roscoe Pound and Charles Beard forged a 
strained conception of the federal judiciary during the Progressive Era.4 Historians have 
since invoked Lochner generally to call upon the overarching jurisprudential trend toward 
“substantive” readings of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
particularly in an economic context.5 Howard Gillman accurately characterized this 
phenomenon as a “persistent neo-Holmesian conceptualization of the Lochner era.”6 
The conventional account of the  Lochner era generally characterizes Supreme 
Court jurisprudence from 1877 to 1934 as the judicial manifestation of conservative 
economic activism—what Barry Cushman describes as the “complimentary factors of a 
commitment to laissez-faire economics, a devotion to the tenets of social Darwinism, and 
 
3 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
4 Fiss, Troubled Beginnings, 6. On contemporary progressive critiques, see Melvin I. 
Urofsky, “Myth and Reality: The Supreme Court and Protective Legislation in the Progressive 
Era,” Supreme Court Historical Society Yearbook (1983): 53–72. See also Brad Snyder, “The 
House That Built Holmes,” Law and History Review 30, no. 3 (August 2012): 661–721. 
5 “Substantive” due process generally indicates a broad or expansive reading of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause in which “‘due process’ . . . could refer to 
‘substantive’ as well as ‘procedural’ guarantees. . . . [Critical commentators] came to use the 
phrase ‘substantive due process’ as a pejorative term, designating cases in which courts had 
inappropriately injected ‘individualism’ and ‘laissez-faire’ views into their readings of ‘liberty’ in 
due process cases.” G. Edward White, “Revisiting Substantive Due Process and Holmes’s 
Lochner Dissent,” Brooklyn Law Review 63, no. 1 (1997): 109–110. White notes that “Holmes 
and the great bulk of his juristic contemporaries . . . never used the term ‘substantive due process’ 
at all.” White, “Revisiting Substantive Due Process,” 87n2. 
6 Howard Gillman, The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise of Lochner Era 




to a desire to shield businesses from legislation aimed at protecting workers and 
consumers.”7 As we have seen, the laissez-faire activist account began with one of 
America’s most illustrious jurists, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., who famously chastised 
the judicial overreaching of his fellow Supreme Court justices as early as 1905.8 
However, Lochner era revisionists have shed new light on this important period and 
thoroughly debunked the conceptions of laissez-faire judicial activism and industrialist 
tycoon protectionism.9 Instead, justices on the high court during this era operated as 
guardians of the “virtues of equality and generality” through the strict application of the 
constitutional principle of “neutrality.”10 Strict, or “formal,” interpretation of the 
Constitution—especially the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses—marked this new account of Lochner era jurisprudence known as legal 
formalism.11  
Although these new interpretive models provide a balanced and meaningful 
 
7 Barry Cushman, “Teaching the Lochner Era,” Saint Louis University Law Journal 62, 
no. 3 (2018): 540. Lochner era historiography conventionally begins with the 1877 case Munn v. 
Illinois and ends either with Nebbia v. New York (1934) or West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish 
(1937). Nebbia marks Cushman’s revision of the Lochner era and the traditional account of the 
“constitutional revolution” of 1937; see Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court: The 
Structure of a Constitutional Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
8 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 74 (Holmes, J., dissenting). See also White, “Revisiting 
Substantive Due Process.” 
9 Authoritative Lochner era revisions are Gillman, The Constitution Besieged; and 
Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court; and Michael Les Benedict, “Laissez-Faire and 
Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism,” Law 
and History Review 3, no. 2 (1985): 293–332. See also William J. Novak, “Law and the Social 
Control of American Capitalism,” Emory Law Journal 60, no. 2 (2010): 377–406; and James W. 
Ely Jr., The Fuller Court: Justices, Rulings, Legacy (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2003). 
10 Cushman, “Teaching the Lochner Era,” 541–544; Gillman, The Constitution Besieged, 
20. 
11 The historiographic phrase “Lochner era” is generally synonymous with the more 
descriptive phrases “era of substantive due process” and “legal formalism.” See Richard A. 
Posner, “Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the 
Constitution,” Case Western Reserve Law Review 37, no. 2 (1986–87): 179–217; and Thomas C. 




account of the development of constitutional law in America, they do so manifestly 
within the economic context of a capitalist enterprise. The preponderance of Lochner era 
legal historiography presents law, society, and politics in inordinately economic terms 
and obscures the persistence of a long-standing and important aspect of American legal 
history: an unwavering jurisprudential commitment to the common-law maxim salus 
populi suprema lex est (the welfare of the people is the supreme law).12 The seemingly 
inescapable legacy of the Lochner era—or, as some historians have referred to it, the 
“ghost” of Lochner13— is its status as the symbol of unrestrained judicial activism and 
the sanctity of economic liberty at the expense of public progress. This is both 
unfortunate and ironic given that the underlying doctrine in Munn v. Illinois—the 
“foundational case for the ‘affected with a public interest doctrine’” that marks the 
beginning of the Lochner era—rested on the legal and philosophical tenets necessary for 
good governance in pursuit of the people’s welfare.14 
Despite this misleading legacy and the generally conservative trend favoring a 
large and robust private sphere, the public sphere and public rights did not disappear. In 
fact, in contravention to the broad sweep of Lochner era generalities, public rights 
flourished throughout the Progressive Era. One particular strand of public rights law 
bears this out: public rights in water. The nineteenth-century common law regulatory 
framework—set upon the hallowed republican ground of salus populi—paved the way 
for the development of a doctrinal set of principles that preserved state water resources 
for the public’s benefit. These public trust principles established what would later 
 
12 Translation in William J. Novak, The People’s Welfare: Law & Regulation in 
Nineteenth-Century America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 9. 
13 Fiss, Troubled Beginnings, 395. 




become known as the public trust doctrine.15  
By 1908 public rights and public trust principles had developed fully enough that 
Justice Holmes, writing for the majority in Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 
delivered an uncompromising declaration of public rights regarding a state’s (New 
Jersey, in this case) water resources: 
[F]ew public interests are more obvious, indisputable and independent of 
particular theory than the interest of the public of a State to maintain the 
rivers that are wholly within it substantially undiminished, except by such 
drafts upon them as the guardian of the public welfare may permit for the 
purpose of turning them to a more perfect use. This public interest is 
omnipresent wherever there is a State, and grows more pressing as 
population grows. It is fundamental, and we are of opinion that the private 
property of riparian proprietors cannot be supposed to have deeper  
roots. . . . The private right to appropriate is subject not only to the rights 
of lower owners, but to the initial limitation that it may not substantially 
diminish one of the great foundations of public welfare and health.16 
 
Joseph Sax, a pioneer of environmental law in the 1970s and preeminent authority on the 
public trust doctrine, described Holmes’s opinion as perhaps “the most important 
statement the Court has ever made about the constitutional status of water rights.”17 Still, 
Hudson County is rarely cited outside of specialized studies and its influence in 
subsequent water rights cases is hardly remarkable.18 Given its supposed importance to 
 
15 For authoritative accounts on the public trust doctrine, see Joseph L. Sax, “The Public 
Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention,” Michigan Law Review 
68, no. 3 (January 1970): 471–566; Joseph L. Sax, “The Limits of Private Rights in Public 
Waters,” Environmental Law 19, no. 3, (Spring 1989): 473–483; Molly Selvin, “The Public Trust 
Doctrine in American Law and Economic Policy, 1789–1920,” Wisconsin Law Review 1980, no. 
6 (1980): 1403–1442; and Charles F. Wilkinson, “The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some 
Thoughts on the Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine,” Environmental Law 19, no. 3 
(Spring 1989): 425–472. 
16 Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356 (1908). 
17 Sax, “The Limits of Private Rights,” 480. 
18 See, for instance, Joseph Regalia and Noah D. Hall, “Waters of the State,” Natural 
Resources Journal 59, no. 1 (Winter 2019): 59–89; and Catherine B. Stetson, “Do State Water 
Anti-Exportation Statutes Violate the Commerce Clause? or Will New Mexico’s Embargo Law 




the “constitutional status of water rights,” as well as its central role in the litigative 
strategy of modern environmental activists, why is Hudson County so absent in the pages 
of legal history?19 If Hudson County has no place in conventional accounts of 
Progressive Era America, what is its significance, if any? Moreover, if “few public 
interests are more obvious” than the rights of the public to state waters, as Justice Holmes 
asserted, how might these rights be construed outside of traditional economic contexts 
(as, for instance, in modern environmental law)?  
An assessment of Hudson County in this regard is necessary precisely because 
Justice Holmes eschewed any economic “clothing,” leaving instead the implication that 
water—transcending mere economic instrumentality—must be considered an essential 
natural resource. Holmes declared that a state need not specify how, why, or to what end 
it might seek to preserve its natural resources.20 This new interpretation of public water 
rights had no precedent—prior to Hudson County, public trust jurisprudence rested 
predominately on economic ground. Yet historians have largely ignored its existence 
because it had no place within the economic context that pervades Lochner era 
historiography. Moreover, Hudson County runs afoul of traditional instrumentalist 
accounts of the nineteenth-century legal order, in which law functioned as a tool for the 
“release of [economic] energy.”21 In other words, it is unnecessary to invoke Hudson 
County where a substantial body of prominent water rights cases more-than-adequately 
supports the assertion that public rights in water were entrenched within an understanding 
 
19 On litigative strategy for modern environmental activists, see Sax, “The Public Trust 
Doctrine,” and Elise L. Larson, “In Deep Water: A Common Law Solution to the Bulk Water 
Export Problem,” Michigan Law Review 96, no. 2 (December 2011): 739–767. 
20 Hudson County, 209 U.S. at 357. 
21 James Willard Hurst, Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth-Century 




of its economic function as either a highway for commerce or a source of production (as 
in a mill dam, for instance). The historical linkages between nineteenth-century American 
economic development and public water rights have been well established; Hudson 
County simply has no place in conventional accounts.22  
In this article I argue that Hudson County is significant because, for the first time 
in US Supreme Court jurisprudence, it implicitly recasts the legal conceptualization of 
water from a predominately economic instrument to a natural resource in and of itself. To 
be clear, the term natural resource is itself ambiguous and somewhat anachronistic in a 
legal sense; I use the term here to connote a modernistic definition that considers natural 
resources as common, naturally occurring elements “existing in a state of ecological 
balance.”23 Prevailing accounts of this period in American legal history, entrenched in 
economic perspectives, obscure this realization. In revisiting this hitherto overlooked and 
underappreciated public water rights case, I show how Justice Holmes, the ideological 
forebear of legal realism, may have been inclined to move with the currents of social 
action within a milieu of progressive social, political, and philosophical ideology that 
undergirded the Progressive Era environmental conservation movement.24 By the time 
 
22 Excellent accounts in this regard include Donald J. Pisani, To Reclaim a Divided West: 
Water, Law, and Public Policy, 1848–1902 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 
1992); Michael C. Blumm and Aurora Paulsen Moses, “The Public Trust as an Antimonopoly 
Doctrine,” Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review 44, no. 1 (2017): 1–54; and Harry 
N. Scheiber, “The Road to Munn: Eminent Domain and the Concept of Public Purpose in the 
State Courts,” in Perspectives in American History, ed. Donald Fleming and Bernard Bailyn 
(Cambridge, MA: Charles Warren Center for Studies in American History, 1971), 5:329–402. 
23 I borrow this exceptional phrase from a modern case which thoroughly examined the 
legal definitional elements of the term natural resource: Paige v. Town Plan Zoning Commission, 
35 Conn. App. 646, 671 (1994) (Schaller, J., dissenting). In regards to Hudson County, the term 
did not officially exist in contemporary legal lexicon; the first edition of Black’s Law Dictionary 
(1891) does not define either natural resource or public resource. 
24 For my purposes here, I use the term legal realism to describe the modernist judicial 
philosophy in which jurisprudents look beyond the confines of orthodox rules, traditions, and 




Holmes drafted his 1908 Hudson County opinion, there was already a substantial 
intellectual framework throughout contemporary American society supporting 
environmental conservation.25 And Holmes, the prototypical jurisprudential realist, 
possessed the uncanny intellectual ability to synthesize and refine such ideas into 
conspicuously transcendent judicial declarations.26 
But, in crafting the majority opinion in Hudson County, Holmes first had to create 
the legal and intellectual space in which to do so. He did this by abrogating any precept 
on which economic substantive due process might prevail among his formalistic 
colleagues; the resultant status of water as a natural resource lacked the economic 
presupposition to which it was previously tied. Holmes then asserted, in plainly crafted 
philosophic language, that state waters were “natural advantages” and “a great public 
good” that ought to be protected and maintained “substantially undiminished.”27 
  Furthermore, analysis of public water rights cases in the Progressive Era 
reaffirms the Lochner era jurisprudential commitment to American constitutional ideals, 
 
ethical principles, and so-called “extra-legal” methods of inquiry. David E. Ingersoll, “Karl 
Llewellyn, American Legal Realism, and Contemporary Legal Behaviorism,” Ethics 76, no. 4 
(July 1966): 264. See also Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (New York: Routledge, 
2017). Frank’s exposition of Oliver Wendell Holmes’s judicial tendencies as a “completely adult 
jurist” is, perhaps, the definitive historical embodiment of legal realism:  
[Holmes’s] judicial opinions and other writings . . . are a treasury of adult 
counsels, of balanced judgments as to the relation of the law to other social 
relations. There you will find a vast knowledge of legal history divorced from 
slavish veneration for the past, a keen sensitiveness to the needs of today with no 
irrational revolt against the conceptions of yesterday, a profound respect for the 
utility of syllogistic reasoning linked with an insistence upon recurrent revisions 
of premises based on patient studies of new facts and new desires. (p. 270) 
25 See Paul Russell Cutright, Theodore Roosevelt: The Making of a Conservationist 
(Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1985); and Philip Shabecoff, A Fierce Green Fire: The 
American Environmental Movement, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2003). 
26 Richard A. Posner, ed., The Essential Holmes: Selections from Letters, Speeches, 
Judicial Opinions, and Other Writings of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1992) xx–xxiii. 




Jacksonian republicanism, and the common-law salus populi maxim. And, as Harry 
Scheiber reminds us, this commitment has been “entirely consistent with the formulation 
of positive notions of public rights.”28 My analysis of Hudson County and the public trust 
doctrine, then, is entirely consistent with Lochner era revisionists’ characterization of 
Supreme Court jurisprudence, which hinged on “distinctions between legitimate 
promotions of the public interest and illegitimate efforts to impose special burdens and 
benefits.”29 With regard to water rights and public trust principles in the late nineteenth 
century, legitimate promotions of the public interest—tied directly to the promotion of 
the American commercial republic—led to the development of a robust public trust 
doctrine. In both a continuation of and a departure from these public trust principles, 
Hudson County shows how a commitment to public rights need not rely on economic 
precepts; the “publicness” of the water itself was good enough. In other words, water 
resources of the state may be preserved in trust for the public without being conditioned 
on or tied to an economic premise. 
My aim is not to rewrite the history of the Lochner era, but to reveal the social 
and philosophical currents upon which postbellum America moved into the Progressive 
Era and how these currents informed modern American law and society. To borrow an 
exceptional line from another context, I intend “to restore the scripto inferior, the 
underlying content that has been obscured in a heavily overwritten palimpsest.”30 While 
 
28 Harry N. Scheiber, “Public Rights and the Rule of Law in American Legal History,” 
California Law Review 72, no. 2 (March 1984): 219 (emphasis in the original). 
29 Gillman, The Constitution Besieged, 9. See also Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal 
Court; and Les Benedict, “Laissez-Faire and Liberty.” 
30 Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez, The Soviet-Israeli War, 1967–1973: The USSR’s 





Lochner era historiography may not quite be heavily overwritten, a substantial number of 
articles and books on the subject points to its significance in the development of 
American constitutional law. If Lochner era historiography has obscured the legal-social-
philosophical nexus represented in Hudson County, this study seeks to shed some light on 
the public rights scripto inferior. 
 
Public Water Rights and the American Commercial Republic 
Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries public water rights 
jurisprudence rested predominately on economic ground. The mercantile importance of 
unhindered trade and mobility on American waterways—that is, the expansion and 
promotion of the American commercial republic—fostered the development of public 
rights principles through which the legal and jurisprudential preservation of public waters 
advanced the general welfare of the people. Often, this was precisely because the best 
economic outcome was the best outcome for the public at large. This utilitarian legal 
doctrine, steeped in the principles of American republicanism and constitutional law, 
characterized the progressive relationship between law and economics in the nineteenth 
century—a relationship within which public water rights thrived.31 
J. Willard Hurst eloquently explained these concepts in his seminal 1956 work 
Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth-Century United States. Hurst 
sweepingly asserted that nineteenth-century American jurisprudents used law as a tool to 
help “create a framework for change” through which the energies of private enterprise 
could be released, thus contributing to the national accumulation of capital (of which “we 
 
31 Hurst, “The Control of the Environment,” chap. 2 in Law and the Conditions. See also 




were scarce”).32 Hurst’s assertion has since become synonymous with a school of thought 
known as legal instrumentalism. A key component of Hurst’s thesis is a differentiation 
between “dynamic” and “static” property in terms of economic productive potential—that 
is, “property in motion or at risk rather than property secure and at rest.”33 Dynamic 
(productive) property was to be safeguarded not out of some obscure deference to vested 
rights, but in pursuit of the great common-law tenet that the welfare of the people runs 
supreme. In the nineteenth-century United States there was no greater public good than 
the national accumulation of capital through private enterprise and commercial 
expansion. 
Hurst described instrumentalism as having a “high regard for keeping open the 
channels of change.” The channels of change meant many things in nineteenth-century 
America, but here we must contend only with one: the American waterway.34 The 
expansion of the American commercial republic—both geographically and 
economically—hinged on unbridled access to and use of these naturally occurring public 
highways. The early-nineteenth-century legal scholar and prolific author of water law 
treatises Joseph Angell commemorated the pivotal role of American waterways in his 
 
32 Hurst, Law and the Conditions, 25. Hurst identified two “working principles” of legal 
instrumentalism:  
(1) The legal order should protect and promote the release of creative energy to 
the greatest extent compatible with the broad sharing of opportunity for such 
expression. . . . (2) The legal order should mobilize the resources of the 
community to help shape an environment which would give men more liberty by 
increasing the practical range of choices open to them and minimizing the 
limiting force of circumstances. (p. 6) 
33 Hurst, 24. 
34 Hurst, 27. Hurst’s “channels of change” refer to the ways in which nineteenth-century 
jurisprudents adhered to doctrinal concepts “in favor of freedom for creative change as against 
unyielding protection for existing commitments . . . to protect the community’s authority to deal 
with shifting conditions affecting the functional integrity of the whole system . . . [and] to 




1857 Treatise on the Law of Highways:  
To them [navigable rivers] has the public at large been extensively 
indebted for the easy and convenient communication by them afforded, 
between the maritime cities and the rapidly growing and productive 
regions of the interior. They have imparted energy to the enterprising 
genius of the people, and been the means of transforming deserts and 
forests into cultivated and fruitful fields, flourishing settlements, and 
opulent cities.35 
 
It was within this context that the preservation of public waters undergirded the 
development of public rights, which paved the way for the establishment of a doctrinal 
set of principles that preserved state water resources in trust for the benefit of the public. 
These public trust principles established what would later become known as the public 
trust doctrine. We must first, however, understand how the “publicness” of nineteenth-
century American waters drew upon a robust common-law heritage of riparian rights and 
“navigability.” 
Chancellor James Kent defined riparian rights in 1827 as the “right[s] of soil of 
owners of land bounded by the sea, or on navigable rivers, where the tide ebbs and flows, 
[and which] extends to high water mark.” Riparian rights did not extend to the submerged 
land underneath water; rather, the banks and beds below the high water mark belonged 
“to the state as trustee for the public . . . and [the people] have the absolute proprietary 
interest in the same.”36 In other words, riparian rights were (and still are) property rights 
incident to navigable waters. Moreover, riparian proprietors held “no property in the 
water itself, but a simple usufruct [right to use without damaging or diminishing] while it 
 
35 Joseph K. Angell and Thomas Durfee, A Treatise on the Law of Highways, 3rd ed., ed. 
George F. Choate (Boston: Little, Brown, 1886), 43, quoted in Novak, The People’s Welfare, 
131. 
36 James Kent, Commentaries on American Law, 13th ed., eds. O. W. Holmes, Jr. and 




passes along.”37  
Chancellor Kent’s definition of riparian rights incorporated the English common-
law determinant of navigability—or, “test of a river’s publicness”: Waters that moved 
with the “ebbs and flows” of the tides were considered navigable.38 The most important 
development in water law during the nineteenth century was the “inland march” of public 
rights on American waterways, wherein the “ebbs and flows” determinant of navigability 
gave way to the broader—and more suitable to “our great rivers and inland seas”—
doctrine of navigable-in-fact in The Propeller Genesee Chief (1851).39 Charles 
Wilkinson points to the “classic definition” for navigable-in-fact waters, as given in The 
Daniel Ball (1870): “[P]ublic navigable rivers . . . are navigable in fact when they are 
used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for 
commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes 
of trade and travel on water.”40 Thus, a “fundamental, redistributive shift” of inland 
waterway rights, from private to public, occurred gradually and incongruously in a 
handful of states during the first half of the nineteenth century—a shift predicated on the 
conceptualization of water as a public highway for commerce.41 Riparian rights are, of 
course, subject to the common-law maxim salus populi suprema lex est (the welfare of 
the people is the supreme law). That is, where public (navigable) waters bound or bisect 
private property, the paramount rights of the public to commerce and navigation prevail; 
 
37 Kent, Commentaries, 3:617.  
38 Novak, The People’s Welfare, 132. 
39 Blumm and Moses, “The Public Trust,” 14; Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 
(1876); The Propeller Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. 443 (1851). 
40 Wilkinson, “The Headwaters of the Public Trust,” 447–448; The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 
557, 563 (1870) (emphasis mine). 





any obstruction to navigation erected by a riparian proprietor (such as a mill dam, for 
instance) might constitute a public nuisance and thus put it at odds with the public 
interest.42  
Hurst built into his model the presumption that liberty meant “liberty for 
individuals.”43 For the conventional legal instrumentalist, individual liberty was both an 
end in itself as well as the means through which the American commercial republic 
“progressed.”44 Yet others, such as Harry Scheiber, have refined this instrumentalist 
approach to show how jurisprudents operated within “the context of a tension model that 
embraces competing principles of law,” i.e., vested rights, public rights, and economic 
growth. Scheiber maintains that such a methodology “can yield a more accurate historical 
understanding of ‘rule’ and ‘policy’ in American legal development.”45 It was indeed 
within this context that the adjudication of water rights disputes that hinged on public-
private distinctions during the late nineteenth century contributed to the development of 
the public trust doctrine. Moreover, it is indicative of the instrumental role of the 
sovereign in promoting the general welfare, what Scheiber describes as a “quest for 
continuity and regularity in rules as being entirely consistent with the formulation of 
positive notions of public rights.”46  
We must remember, too, that public interest doctrine had been “sufficiently 
developed” by the mid-nineteenth century, well before the “startling intrusion” of 
Munn.47 In one of his many excellent contributions to the historiography of public rights 
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and constitutional law in America, Scheiber dismisses the “common view” that the 
decision in Munn was based on a “novel, or inexplicable, application” of an obscure 
seventeenth-century legal concept.48 Instead, Scheiber argues, “the basic concept of 
‘public interest’” had been well established in American law by the mid-nineteenth 
century and undergirded the development of a robust public rights tradition.49 What 
Justice Stephen Field and his colleagues did, then, was to build on this regulatory 
tradition through innovative applications of public rights jurisprudence in order to 
maintain an American economic order then at risk of being toppled by competing policy 
demands and external forces.  
It is necessary now to differentiate between public interest doctrine—which 
defined Munn and the Lochner era—and the public trust doctrine upon which public 
water rights prevailed. First, public interest doctrine must not be confused with what 
Scheiber cogently refers to as the “affectation doctrine” that characterized the formalistic 
judicial policing of the boundary between “two kinds of business enterprises—those 
affected with the public interest and those not so affected.”50 Simply put, the affectation 
doctrine referred to the nature of Lochner era jurisprudence whereby the Supreme Court 
strictly distinguished between a public sphere and a private sphere. Lochner era 
formalists policed the boundaries of these spheres to determine what was public (and, 
thereby, subject to regulation) and what was private (and off limits to regulatory 
government intervention).51 Outside of this retrospective interpretation of the Supreme 
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Court from 1877 to 1934,52 public interest doctrine may simply be understood as the 
jurisprudential tendency to promote the broad interests and welfare of the public over the 
rights of any individual.53  
The public trust doctrine, on the other hand, refers to the jurisprudential 
commitment to secure, in trust for the people, common (or, public) property for the 
common good.54 What distinguishes the public trust doctrine is its positivist legal role 
and requisite reliance on governmental authority to restrain private property when the 
general welfare demands it. When private rights begin to prevent, limit, or injure the 
rights of the public it is this sovereign power—the police power—that authorizes the 
government to restrain or regulate private rights for the benefit of the public.55 Thus, the 
public trust doctrine inherently relies on two essential concepts: public interest and the 
police power.  
 
52 That is, the Lochner era—from Munn v. Illinois (1877) to Nebbia v. New York (1934) 
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private use inappropriate,” premised on the exercise of the police power “to enlarge or diminish 
the public rights for some legitimate public purpose . . . within the legitimate scope of regulatory 
powers.” Sax, “The Public Trust Doctrine,” 485, 476, 478. See also Selvin, “The Public Trust 
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power in Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 53, 85 (1851):  
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injurious, and to such reasonable restraints and regulations established by law, as 
the legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the 
constitution, may think necessary and expedient. . . . The power we allude to is 
rather the police power, the power vested in the legislature by the constitution, to 
make, ordain and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, 
statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the 
constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the 




Development of the public trust doctrine can be traced through a few 
representative Supreme Court water rights cases in the late nineteenth century that, 
incidentally, upheld both public water rights and broad commercial interests.56 These 
cases forged a doctrinal set of judicial principles that preserved state water resources in 
trust for the benefit of the public. It is important to understand here that these trust 
principles protected the submerged land (the common property of the people) beneath the 
water and not the water itself—recall that there can be “no property in the water itself, 
but a simple usufruct while it passes along.”57  
The first case to consider is Barney v. Keokuk (1876), in which the court 
determined that public improvements to the bed or bank of a navigable river that obstruct 
a riparian proprietor’s access to the water do not constitute a taking.58 In Barney, a 
riparian proprietor along the Mississippi River disputed the City of Keokuk’s erection of 
a steamboat landing on “newly made ground below original high water.”59 The Supreme 
Court upheld the lower court ruling in favor of the city, finding that the steamboat 
landing is “a public use of the river bank, which is absolutely necessary to the use of the 
river as a navigable water.”60 Furthermore, the court clarified that “the shore between 
high and low water mark, as well as the bed of the river, belongs to the state.”61 Most 
importantly, the court affirmed that “public authorities ought to have entire control of the 
 
56 These cases are indicative of the broad development of the public trust doctrine, but by 
no means comprise the entirety of case law that contributed to its development. For 
comprehensive analysis of public trust case law, see Blumm and Moses, “The Public Trust”; Sax, 
“The Public Trust Doctrine”; and Selvin, “The Public Trust Doctrine.” 
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great passageways of commerce and navigation, to be exercised for the public advantage 
and convenience.”62 Barney, then, affirmed the proprietorship of a state in the beds and 
banks of its public waterways for the express purposes of “commerce and navigation.” 
Moreover, Barney presents a straightforward precedent for public-private water rights 
disputes. In affirming that the “proprietorship of the beds and shores of such [navigable] 
waters . . . properly belongs to the States by their inherent sovereignty,” the court paved 
the way for a more assertive affirmation of public trust principles.63 
The justices in Barney asserted the paramount rights of the public to the beds and 
banks of the Mississippi River for the express purpose of protecting the vast commercial 
interests at stake. In Hurst’s model, this public property was dynamic and productive, 
whereas the riparian claimant’s static property contributed little to the American 
commercial republic. Furthermore, the justices established a firm boundary at the “high 
water mark” at which they could distinguish between the paramount public interest in 
commercial navigation and the subservient private rights of Barney. Barney was decided 
a year before Munn v. Illinois (1877), the “foundational case for the ‘affected with a 
public interest doctrine’” that marks the beginning of the Lochner era.64 In a scathing 
dissent in Munn, Justice Field decried the “clothing” of a private business with “magic” 
language intended to “change a private business into a public one.”65 Field’s dissent 
ultimately set the tone for decades of substantive due process interpretation during the 
Lochner era. For Justice Field, the public-private distinction was inviolable, and he 
“refused to provide ‘a harbor where refuge can be found’ for the inconsistent claims of 
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any particularistic interest group.”66 This distinction can be seen in Barney, yet Field 
himself proved his willingness to uphold the public side of the public-private distinction 
fifteen years later.  
In what would become the “central substantive thought in [twentieth-century] 
public trust litigation,” Justice Field’s majority opinion in Illinois Central Railroad v. 
Illinois (1892) firmly established the public trust doctrine as the juridical guardian of 
public waterways.67 The justices in Illinois Central confronted the question whether the 
Illinois legislature’s 1869 grant of a vast tract of submerged land along Chicago’s 
waterfront to the Illinois Central Railroad Corporation could be revoked without 
compensation. In the original 1869 act authorizing the grant, the state legislature intended 
to grant the title and interests of the submerged lands in question to the city of Chicago. 
However, the final version that passed (over the governor’s veto) ceded them instead to 
the railroad company; the legislature repealed the act in 1873, thus revoking the railroad’s 
grant.68 Nonetheless, Illinois Central Railroad continued to build on these since-revoked 
submerged lands and the state, in 1883, sought injunctive relief through the courts.69 
The question, as Justice Field put it, was “whether the railroad corporation can 
hold the lands and control the waters by the grant against any future exercise of power 
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over them by the State.”70 He strongly rejected such an absolute derogation of the state’s 
power as trustee for the public:  
Any grant of the kind is necessarily revocable, and the exercise of the trust 
by which the property was held by the State can be resumed at any time . . . 
[and] the power to resume the trust whenever the State judges best is, we 
think, incontrovertible.71 
 
Field asserted that the “control of the State for the purposes of the [public] trust can never 
be lost.”72 One such purpose of the public trust, then, was ensuring that any 
conveyance—from the state to a private party, corporation, or municipality—of rights or 
title in submerged lands beneath navigable waters only occur “when that can be done 
without substantial impairment of the interest of the public in the waters.”73 In other 
words, any state grant of rights or title in trust property must remain subservient to the 
public interest and the common good. 
More importantly, Justice Field integrated the two core tenets of the public trust 
doctrine: public interest and the police power. Field likened an alienation of a state’s trust 
obligations to the preposterous concept of a state relinquishing its police powers: “The 
State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are 
interested, like navigable waters and soils under them, . . . than it can abdicate its police 
powers in the administration of government and the preservation of the peace.”74 This 
link between public interest, trust obligations, and the police power validated the 
doctrinal integrity of “positive notions of public rights.”75 Here again, as in Barney, a 
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Supreme Court decision significantly expanded the scope and intent of public trust 
principles in support of the common ideological tenet of securing the American 
commercial republic. Yet Illinois Central relied heavily on an 1856 Iowa state court 
decision of “signal importance” to public water rights jurisprudence.76  
Scheiber asserts that “the Iowa court unequivocally asserted the public interest in 
a mighty river [the Mississippi] that ran its course through half the length of a continent, 
carrying the commerce of the American heartland.”77 Glaringly obvious in this statement 
is the underlying economic dimension in which the American public held a paramount 
interest. Where Justice Field declared in 1892 that submerged lands were held “in trust 
for the people of the State that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on 
commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing,”78 Iowa Justice William Woodward 
wrote some thirty-six years previously that the submerged lands and waters of the 
Mississippi River belonged to the sovereign “as a trust for the public use and benefit.”79 
Justice Field is often cast as a champion of legal conservatism and laissez-faire 
constitutionalism, but this betrays his important contributions to the development of the 
public trust doctrine.80 As we have seen, Justice Field concurred in Barney and later 
authored the majority opinion in Illinois Central, two of the most important doctrinal 
cases in public trust jurisprudence. And, as Scheiber again reminds us, it was “Justice 
Field, the high priest of judicial conservatism and vested property rights, and former 
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California judge, who wrote the decision upholding public policy and state discretion.”81 
Thus, similar to the obfuscation of public rights and public trust doctrine during the 
Lochner era, to accept disparagingly reductionist accounts of Justice Field’s 
jurisprudence obscures the true nature and significance of his contributions to American 
constitutional law. 
Charles McCurdy and Harry Scheiber have pointed to the significance of Justice 
Field’s “energetic” and “innovative” public rights jurisprudence in mid-nineteenth-
century California—and later on the US Supreme Court—in contributing to the 
development of the public trust doctrine.82 Contrary to prevailing (and misguided) 
accounts, Justice Field did not act simply as the judicial steward of big business and 
inviolable constitutional guarantees of economic liberty. Rather, Field’s Jacksonian 
conception of law, liberty, public economy, and commercial republicanism undergirded 
his efforts to secure, in the public interests of general economic growth, a thriving private 
sphere in which unwarranted government regulation ought not interfere. As McCurdy 
explains, Field “believed that public and private institutions had diametrically opposed 
reasons for existence; legislation that vested public property in private corporations 
would invariably lead to situations in which the people would be subject to private 
greed.”83 Field thus sought to “proscribe virtually every form of special privilege. The 
result would be a harmonious system in which the public and private sectors pursued 
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appropriate goals within proper spheres of action.” As far as Justice Field was concerned, 
private corporations could not and should not be “affected” with a public interest.  
So, in contravention to the general confines of Lochner era public-sphere 
diminution, public rights in water underwent a doctrinal expansion through the 
development and innovative judicial application of public trust principles. By the turn of 
the century, a full-fledged public trust doctrine had been established—primarily through 
instrumentalist processes that contributed to the expansion of the American commercial 
republic. Before we proceed further, I must draw once more upon the preeminent 
authority on public trust doctrine, Joseph Sax, who characterized the doctrine in two 
important ways. First, drawing together basic principles from the classic case of 
Commonwealth v. Alger (1851) as well as the much later case State v. Cleveland and 
Pittsburgh Railway (1916), he articulated the following tenet: 
No grant may be made to a private party if that grant is of such amplitude 
that the state will effectively have given up its authority to govern, but a 
grant is not illegal solely because it diminishes in some degree the 
quantum of traditional public uses.84 
 
And, more specific to the role of positive governance with regard to state police powers:  
When a state holds a resource which is available for the free use of the 
general public, a court will look with considerable skepticism upon any 
governmental conduct which is calculated either to reallocate that resource 
to more restricted uses or to subject public uses to the self-interest of 
private parties.85 
 
Thus, when the New Jersey-based Hudson County Water Company contracted in 1905 to 
provide water from an inland diversion of New Jersey’s Passaic River to a New York 
 
84 Sax, “The Public Trust Doctrine,” 488–489. 




City borough, both state and federal courts looked “with considerable skepticism” upon 
the proposed reallocation of New Jersey state waters.86 
 
Transcending the Economic Dimension: Water as a Natural Resource 
In Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter (1908), the US Supreme Court invoked 
public trust principles to affirm the right of a state (New Jersey) “to protect the 
atmosphere, the water, and the forests within its territory, irrespective of the assent or 
dissent of the private owners of the land.”87 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the 
“enlightened apostle of judicial self-restraint,” asserted in the majority opinion that state 
waters were “natural advantages” to be protected and maintained “substantially 
undiminished.”88 Justice Holmes’s opinion was characteristically forthright and concise, 
and is indicative of his fully matured “philosophical views on sovereignty in a republic, 
as well as his jurisprudential views on the scope of judicial review . . . [and] legislative 
supremacy in the American constitutional republic.”89 Consider as well Holmes’s unique 
intellectual ability to synthesize and refine social, philosophical, and legal ideas into 
succinct and universally applicable judicial opinions.90 Among his many other 
contributions to the United States, Hudson County reveals the creative and innovative 
synthesis of progressive legal philosophy, environmental conservationism, and public 
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More importantly, and breaking with the economic instrumentalism inherent in 
previous public water rights cases, Hudson County reconceptualized the state’s public 
trust obligations to the protection of water as a natural resource in and of itself. Justice 
Holmes, the preeminent progressive jurist and legal realist, characteristically cut through 
the formalistic claims on which the Hudson County Water Company sought relief and 
found the issue to be a question of a state’s right to maintain its natural water resources—
decoupled from any economic presupposition—for the common good. In weighing this 
question Holmes resorted to well-established and validated public trust principles. 
However, recall that the public trust doctrine at the turn of the century protected 
submerged lands beneath the water as public property in trust for the people—it did not 
protect the water itself. Furthermore, the public trust doctrine developed within a 
decidedly economic instrumentalist framework and, consequently, economic interests 
undergirded the legal principles through which the doctrine could be applied. 
Thus, Holmes faced a quandary: Decide the case upon the well-established, yet 
economically imbued, public trust doctrine; or, transcend the economic dimension 
altogether and reconceptualize the rights of the public to preserve the state’s natural water 
resources. Holmes could have cited even just a few prominent public trust case 
precedents—Illinois Central, Barney, or Shively v. Bowlby,91 for instance—to affirm the 
right of New Jersey to restrain the Hudson County Water Company from artificially 
transporting Passaic River waters outside of the state. Such an interpretation would itself 
have been a novel expansion of the public trust doctrine beyond its standard proprietary 
 




interest in the land beneath the Passaic River and into the realm of protecting the water 
itself. However, invocation of the public trust doctrine in this manner would carry with it 
the affirmation that “[w]ater when reduced to possession is a commodity, which may be 
sold, like any other.”92 Holmes would then have to contend both with the constitutional 
issue of interstate commerce and the formalistic tendencies of his colleagues toward 
substantive readings of the Due Process Clause.93 As we shall see, however, Holmes 
indeed relied on public trust principles but cited instead Geer v. Connecticut (1896), 
seemingly placing authority for his Hudson County opinion upon the tenuous concept of 
public ownership.94  
We shall return to the public ownership theory in more detail momentarily; first, 
we must examine the case itself and the ways in which Justice Holmes interpreted it on 
behalf of the majority court. The Hudson County case hinged on a June 1905 New Jersey 
state injunction against the Hudson County Water Company seeking to prevent the 
diversion and sale “without limitation as to quantity” of Passaic River waters from an 
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upstream facility in Little Falls, New Jersey, to customers in Staten Island, New York.95 
At the time, fresh water on Staten Island was sourced from seven wells throughout the 
island, which a sub-committee report to the New York City Board of Estimate and 
Apportionment asserted “are clearly incapable of supplying enough water for the whole 
island” and “will not permanently supply the needs of the growing population.”96 
Following the 1898 consolidation of Greater New York and subsequent establishment in 
1905 of the State Water Supply Commission, efforts began on construction of a city-wide 
municipal water supply system linking the boroughs to the upstate Croton and Catskill 
mountain aqueduct systems.97 However, these projects would take years to complete and 
the contract with Hudson County Water was a temporary measure intended to provide 
“immediate relief” to the strained water supply system on Staten Island.98 
New Jersey, facing its own water supply crisis, determined not to go along with 
this plan. The New York Times reported that New Jersey state officials “became exercised 
over the proposition of the East Jersey Company to furnish water to any borough of New 
York City, seeming to fear that the city has designs on all of the watersheds of the 
adjoining State.”99 This account seems well attenuated to the political circumstances at 
the time, especially considering the long-standing animosity between the two states over 
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waterway rights as well as the jurisdiction of Staten Island itself.100 The injunction 
brought by New Jersey Attorney General Robert McCarter carried with it the authority of 
the state’s 1905 Batcheller Act, which made it “unlawful for any person or corporation to 
transport or carry, through pipes, conduits, ditches or canals, the waters of any fresh 
water lake, pond, brook, creek, river or stream of this state [New Jersey] into any other 
state, for use therein.” Legislative officials in New Jersey thus sought, in the face of rapid 
urbanization and growing demand for fresh water on both sides of the state boundary, to 
“preserve and maintain” the waters of New Jersey for the “health and prosperity of all 
citizens of this state.”101 
In the first state case, McCarter v. Hudson County Water Co. (N.J. 1905) 
(hereinafter McCarter I), Vice Chancellor James Bergen affirmed the state’s assertion of 
its inherent right to preserve its natural supply of water despite the fact “that the present 
available supply of water in the Passaic river is largely in excess of the present 
consumption by New Jersey inhabitants, as now supplied.”102 Bergen asserted, in clear 
and efficient prose, that the state’s justification of perceived future demand outweighed 
the Hudson County Water Company’s claims to present excesses of supply.103 More 
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importantly, Bergen expanded the application of public trust principles beyond 
conventional proprietary interests in submerged lands by reasoning that “the state in its 
sovereign right, as owner of the bed of all tidal streams, becomes the owner of all fresh 
water flowing upon its land.”104 And the state, furthermore, “being the last riparian 
owner[,] . . . should be considered as the ultimate owner of such unused common 
property, to be held in trust for the use of all its subjects.” The “unused common 
property” Bergen referred to was the running water that remained after it had “already 
served the proper purposes of [upstream] private riparian owners.”105  
The concept of public ownership—that is, state ownership of public waters (as 
“common property”)—that Bergen asserted in McCarter I seems remarkably similar to 
the public trust doctrine, which I described above as the jurisprudential commitment to 
secure, in trust for the people, public property for the common good. Yet the public trust 
doctrine at the time pertained strictly to the title of submerged lands beneath navigable 
waters—not the water itself—and the question in McCarter I (as it did in later iterations) 
dealt squarely with the water itself. Vice Chancellor Bergen took the view that the 
 
The constant increase in our population, considered in connection with the 
unchanging extent of our watershed and the consequent limit of the natural 
supply of water necessary for domestic and healthful purposes, may justly alarm 
the state with regard to the future . . . and justifies the restriction of the 
appropriation of its property. It is admitted that the Passaic river is the most 
important of the available sources of water supply for the people of New Jersey, 
and that their necessity, therefore, is constantly increasing. 
104 McCarter I, 70 N.J. Eq. at 535. 
105 McCarter I, 70 N.J. Eq. at 531–533. Bergen declared:  
Thus it appears from immemorial times running water . . . has been esteemed 
common property, subject to usufructuary use by the owners of land over which 
it passed . . . If diverted, it must be returned undiminished, except as to the 
incidental waste made necessary by the personal private use, for domestic and 
other recognized lawful purposes.” 
Recall as well that riparian proprietors held “no property in the water itself, but a simple usufruct 




Hudson County Water Company’s purported right to divert water from the Passaic River 
“without limitation as to quantity” could “only be sustained upon the ground of 
ownership.”106 Thus Bergen relied on common-law authorities as well as an earlier New 
Jersey water rights case to assert that the water company held absolutely no such 
“exclusive ownership in running water,” whereas the state, as “ultimate owner,” could 
freely restrain any interference, diversion, or abstraction of its water.107 
In McCarter II (N.J. 1906), the superior New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals 
affirmed the lower court’s findings against private ownership and rights of diversion.108 
McCarter II seemed to reaffirm the significance of state trusteeship with regard to public 
waters: Vice Chancellor Bergen’s “unused common property . . . held in trust for the use 
of all its subjects” became, in McCarter II, a “residuum of common or public ownership 
that under our system rests in the state as a trustee for all the people.”109 However the 
superior court, citing Geer v. Connecticut, distinguished the concept of public ownership 
as an absolute, sovereign “right of control.”110 This interpretation grossly misconstrued 
Geer and the concept of public ownership, imbuing the state with ultimate authority 
“subject to no constraints, not even to constitutional restrictions.”111 Not surprisingly, 
 
106 McCarter I, 70 N.J. Eq. at 526, 528. 
107 McCarter I, 70 N.J. Eq. at 530, 535. 
108 McCarter II, 70 N.J. Eq. at 708. “[R]iparian owners, as such, have not any such right 
in or ownership of the waters that flow upon or past their lands as will entitle them to divert a 
portion of the flow and convey it elsewhere for the use of others than riparian owners.” 
109 McCarter I, 70 N.J. Eq. at 533; McCarter II, 70 N.J. Eq. at 711 (emphasis in the 
original). 
110 McCarter II, 70 N.J. Eq. at 712. In Geer, the Supreme Court affirmed Connecticut’s 
right to prohibit out-of-state transportation of lawfully killed wild birds on the grounds that the 
wild birds belonged “in common to all the people of the state” and could never, therefore, “be the 
object of commerce except with the consent of the state, and subject to the conditions which it 
may deem best to impose for the public good.” Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 535 (1896). 
111 George Cameron Coggins, “Wildlife and the Constitution: The Walls Come Tumbling 




Geer and the public ownership theory were later “progressively cut back until Geer itself 
was overruled in 1979.”112  
While the state may be said to hold common property in trust (as the justices in 
both McCarter I and II did), the underlying presumption was that the state, as “ultimate 
owner,” could regulate such common property solely through its authority as the 
sovereign owner. In other words, such regulation need not be premised on that cardinal 
concept of public interest—sovereign ownership carried with it an absolute and 
unconditional right of control. The patent absurdity of such a doctrine did not go 
unnoticed; the Supreme Court itself repeatedly derided the “whole ownership theory” in 
subsequent wildlife management cases, characterizing it as “a weak prop,” “pure 
fantasy,” and “legal fiction.”113 More importantly, the court’s assertion in Toomer v. 
Witsell (1948) highlights the fallacy of public ownership theory as “but a fiction 
expressive in legal shorthand of the importance to its people [that is, the paramount 
public interest] that a State have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an 
important resource.”114  
Here, then, is the distinction between public ownership—with its faulty 
presumption of absolute and unconditional right of control—and public trust, which is 
 
dual federalism never materialized; Geer and the public ownership theory were “progressively cut 
back until Geer itself was overruled in 1979.” (p. 314) 
112 Coggins, “Wildlife and the Constitution,” 314. The Supreme Court blatantly referred 
to public ownership as “theory” in Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 402 (1948). 
113 Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 401 (1948); Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 
U.S. 265, 284 (1977); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979). 
114 Toomer, 334 U.S. at 402. Holmes himself used remarkably similar language to dismiss 
the Lochner era affectation doctrine: “[T]he notion that a business is clothed with a public interest 
and has been devoted to the public use is little more than a fiction intended to beautify what is 
disagreeable to the sufferers.” Tyson v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 446 (1927) (Holmes, J., 




undergirded by the core tenets of public interest and state police power. The state indeed 
retains a “right of control” with the public trust doctrine, but control resides in the police 
power of the state—not as proprietor but as trustee for the public—to be exercised only in 
pursuit of a valid public interest. Ownership theory amounts to a tacit recognition that the 
state may regulate common property or restrain private or qualified rights in public 
property freely and solely on the basis that it is the absolute, or “ultimate,” owner—
without a concomitantly sufficient public interest justification. Thus, when the case came 
before the US Supreme Court in 1908, Justice Holmes must have understood this 
fallibility of the public ownership theory and steered clear of invoking it. 
In Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, Justice Holmes asserted that his 
decision rested “upon broader ground than that which was emphasized below, since in 
our opinion it is independent of the more or less attenuated residuum of title that the State 
may be said to possess.”115 Broader ground it was indeed, for Holmes imbued his opinion 
with public trust principles while simultaneously separating it from the economic 
instrumentalist framework within which the public trust doctrine typically operated. To 
accomplish this, Holmes cited Geer v. Connecticut to uphold the state court’s finding that 
the illegally diverted waters of the Passaic River could not enter into interstate 
commerce.116 Even further, he borrowed from Vice Chancellor Bergen the expansion of 
public trust principles beyond the standard beds-and-banks application, yet he refused to 
subscribe to anything resembling the ownership theory. Instead, Justice Holmes recast the 
 
115 Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 354–355 (1908). 
116 Just as the wild birds in Geer could never enter into commerce without the consent of 
the state, so too did the New Jersey Court of Errors determine that the waters of the Passaic River, 
“abstracted” without the consent of the state—the “ultimate owner”—“cannot legitimately enter 




public trust doctrine into a more universal proposition of public rights in which water 
existed as a natural resource in and of itself. 
Justice Holmes’s reliance on Geer is both remarkably deceptive and strikingly 
simple. Holmes cited Geer not to invoke the potentially troublesome ownership theory, 
but rather to invoke the public trust doctrine. Holmes’s first citation to Geer appears at 
the end of the following passage:  
[T]he State, as quasi-sovereign and representative of the interests of the 
public . . . may protect by suit in this court from interference in the name 
of property outside of the State’s jurisdiction, [and] one would think that it 
could protect by statute from interference in the same name within. On 
this principle of public interest and the police power, and not merely as the 
inheritor of a royal prerogative, the State may make laws for the 
preservation of game, which seems a stronger case. Geer v. Connecticut, 
161 U.S. 519, 534.117  
 
Here, Justice Holmes at once props up the principles of the public trust (“On this 
principle of public interest and the police power . . .”), evades the public ownership 
theory (“. . . and not merely as the inheritor of a royal prerogative . . .” [from which the 
“residuum of public ownership” conveys]), and then affirms both Geer and Hudson 
County on the basis of the public trust doctrine (“. . . the State may make laws for the 
preservation of game, which seems a stronger case.”). In fact, Holmes’s citation to Geer 
points specifically to the concluding section of Justice White’s Geer opinion in which he 
turns from ownership concepts to public interest and police power, asserting “the 
undoubted existence in the State of a police power . . . [which] flows from the duty of the 
State to preserve for its people a valuable food supply.”118 This indisputable state police 
power, Justice Holmes declared, superseded any claims of deprivation of property 
 
117 Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355–356 (1908) (citing Kansas 
v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 [1902], and Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 [1907]). 




without due process, and so “[t]he defense under the Fourteenth Amendment is disposed 
of by what we have said.”119 
Justice Holmes further dispensed with the Hudson County Water Company’s 
remaining claims rather curtly. Of the supposed impairment of the obligation of 
contracts: “One whose rights . . . are subject to state restriction cannot remove them from 
the power of the State by making a contract about them.” Citing Geer one more time to 
deny any interference with interstate commerce: “A man cannot acquire a right to 
property by his desire to use it in commerce among the States. Neither can he enlarge his 
otherwise limited and qualified right to the same end.” And, lastly, of the supposed denial 
of equal privileges: “Within the boundary [of New Jersey], citizens of New York are as 
free to purchase as citizens of New Jersey.”120  
 Thus, Holmes applied public trust principles to Hudson County without ever 
explicitly doing so. He refused to ground his opinion on an economic presupposition in 
which New Jersey water functioned either as a highway for commerce, as a source of 
power or production, or as an article of commerce. Rather, he relied on simple, self-
evident assertions to establish his “broader ground”:  
[F]ew public interests are more obvious, indisputable, and independent of 
particular theory than the interest of the public of a State to maintain the 
rivers that are wholly within it substantially undiminished, except by such 
drafts upon them as the guardian of the public welfare may permit for the 
purpose of turning them to a more perfect use.121 
And, more plainly:  
The legal conception of the necessary [potential use cases of water] is apt 
to be confined to somewhat rudimentary wants, and there are benefits 
 
119 Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 357 (1908). 
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from a great river that might escape a lawyer's view. . . . [The state] finds 
itself in possession of what all admit to be a great public good.122 
Holmes further declared that a state need not specify how, why, or to what end it might 
seek to preserve its natural resources: “[W]hat it has it may keep and give no one a reason 
for its will.”123 Hudson County thus underscores the inherent and indisputable public 
interest duty of a state, as “guardian of the public welfare,” to protect and maintain public 
waters, no matter to what end.124 It becomes clear, then, that public waters of the state—
lacking any real or supposed economic purpose or private interest—ought to be 
considered a natural resource. 
The question remains, then, as to why Holmes’s majority colleagues—except lone 
dissenter Justice McKenna, who did not pen a dissenting opinion—concurred with his 
decision. The most likely answer stems from the fact that the water company’s contract 
“was illegal when it was made,” thus abrogating any grounds for a formalist “liberty of 
contract” interpretation; Holmes’s colleagues had no choice but to concur in favor of 
public rights.125 The implicit recognition of water as a natural resource may be seen as 
especially novel given that the term natural resource is itself ambiguous and somewhat 
anachronistic in a legal sense. Holmes may not have felt inclined to use the term because 
it did not officially exist in legal lexicon. For instance, the first edition of Black’s Law 
Dictionary (1891) does not define either natural resource or public resource.126 The 
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superior state court judgment he affirmed, however, freely used the term in its 
contemporary conservationist context: 
The act of 1905 [prohibiting the transportation of water outside the state of 
New Jersey] looks not only to the present, but to the future. It recognizes 
that the growth and prosperity of the state depend not alone upon the 
advantages that it presently affords, but upon the assurance that the like 
advantages, to the extent of our natural resources, properly conserved, will 
remain for posterity. This policy of foresight, and the desire to fore-close 
in advance any claim of a vested right to transport the waters of our lakes 
and streams beyond the borders of the state, doubtless entered into the 
motive of the legislature in imposing a present prohibition.”127 
 
Holmes may also have avoided the term, moreover, because of the economic 
pretext associated with it. As with the economic instrumentalist component of late-
nineteenth-century American law, environmental conservationism was steeped in 
American capitalist and republican ideology—to many Americans, conservation meant 
the preservation of forests, rivers, and soil for continued economic exploitation, but 
through more responsible and sustainable programs.128 Later editions of Black’s Law 
Dictionary—even as late as the ninth edition in 2009—presume this economic basis, 
defining natural resource as “[a]ny material from nature having potential economic value 
or providing for the sustenance of life, such as timber, minerals, oil, water, and 
wildlife.”129 Holmes thus used plain terms such as “natural advantages” and “great public 
 
who likes, it is said to be “publici juris;” as in the case of light, air, and public 
water. Or it designates things which are owned by ‘the public;’ that is, the entire 
state or community, and not by any private person.” (p. 965; emphasis in the 
original) 
The second edition (1910) defines water-course as a “natural stream of water fed from permanent 
or periodically natural sources.” (p. 1223) 
127 McCarter II, 70 N.J. Eq. at 721. 
128 See Cutright, Theodore Roosevelt; and Shabecoff, A Fierce Green Fire.  
129 Bryan A. Garner, ed., Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th ed. (St. Paul, MN: Thomson 
Reuters, 2009), 1127. A second, more “modern” definition is given as well: “Environmental 




good” to imbue his opinion—and the constitutional status of water rights—with public 
trust principles and the progressive, non-exploitative ideals of environmental 
conservation.130 
 
Realism and Environmental Conservation: The Holmes-Roosevelt Nexus 
How, then, can we explain Holmes’s Hudson County opinion and its significance? 
It is difficult to assess Holmes’s reasoning outside of the reported Supreme Court 
opinion. Despite being a prolific writer and expositor in both public and private 
correspondence throughout his lifetime, Holmes hardly ever mentioned the Hudson 
County case.131 Nor has Holmes’s judicial legacy ever been assessed within the context 
of environmental conservationism, one of the great philosophical and political 
movements of the early twentieth century.  
We have seen how easy it was for Holmes to undercut his formalistic colleagues 
by disqualifying the case for consideration on a “liberty of contract” premise. Relying on 
public trust principles to affirm New Jersey’s right to regulate its natural water resources 
would have been difficult without reckoning as well with the constitutional issue of 
interstate commerce. In order to avoid this problem, as we have seen, Holmes 
reconceptualized public trust principles while simultaneously separating them from the 
economic instrumentalist framework within which the public trust doctrine typically 
 
130 Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356, 357 (1908). 
131 Notwithstanding the May 30, 1908, letter to Nina Gray (see note 132 below), 
Holmes’s only reference to Hudson County appears in a letter to John Henry Wigmore—in 
response to a query for some of Holmes’s published court opinions—in which Holmes cites 
Hudson County as a case on “rights of State v. State etc.” Holmes to Wigmore, December 4, 
1910, General Correspondence, Mark Dewolfe Howe Research Materials, Oliver Wendell 




operated. Yet this does not answer the question of how or why  water needed to be 
“reconceptualized.” If Holmes imbued his opinion with the progressive, non-exploitative 
ideals of environmental conservation, how did he do so? In considering Hudson County 
as a question of a state’s right to maintain its natural water resources for the perpetual 
common good, Holmes must have shifted perspectives, looking not to “a study of [law] 
as an anthropological document from the outside,” but rather to the “establishment of 
[legal] postulates from within upon accurately measured social desires.”132 To find these 
contemporary social and political imperatives, we need look no further than May 1908, 
little more than a month after the Hudson County decision. 
One of Holmes’s few written references—an indirect reference, no less—to his 
Hudson County opinion appears in a May 30, 1908, letter to Nina Gray. Holmes wrote of 
a White House dinner reception he attended on May 12, the night prior to a “meeting of 
the Governors,” and that “[t]he next day in his opening address the Presd’t . . . [illegible]  
. . . with a quotation from an opinion of mine.”133 The opinion, of course, was Hudson 
 
132 Oliver Wendell Holmes, “Law in Science and Science in Law,” in Collected Legal 
Papers (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920), 225–226. 
133 Holmes to Nina Gray, May 30, 1908, John G. Palfrey Collection of Oliver Wendell 
Holmes Jr. Papers, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. Digital Suite, Harvard Law School Library. In the 
letter, Holmes seems amenable to Roosevelt’s Hudson County comments, but several illegible 
sections preclude a thorough transcription of his words: 
. . . a quotation from an opinion of mine which a little before the . . . [illegible] . . . 
of an attack. Which squared things. That night I went to a private dinner . . . and 
had a very nice talk with the Presdt (in which coincidentally we said our last 
words about the old No. Securities Case & that matter is finished).” (see note 142 
below)  
The illegible portions of Holmes’s letter are characteristic of his awful handwritten prose, as 
described in one-time Holmes law clerk Chauncey Belknap’s October 8, 1915, diary entry: 
I chuckled when he [Holmes] complimented my handwriting. Dean Thayer 
[Harvard Dean of Law] is the only other person who has been equally generous, 
and these two have the worst hands ever man attempted to decipher. The justice 
tells the story on himself of Chief Justice Field, of Mass., who exclaimed in 
despair, “Holmes, you are indictable as a fraud at common law, because your 




County, which Roosevelt lauded in his opening address to the 1908 Conference of the 
Governors on natural resource management and environmental conservation as the “root 
of the idea of conservation of our resources in the interests of our people.”134 Here, at the 
Conference of the Governors, we find the social and political imperatives that 
undergirded the “accurately measured social desires” upon which Holmes must have 
leaned.  
The 1908 Conference of the Governors may rightly be understood as “the 
beginning of a true national conservation movement.”135 Paul Russell Cutright wrote in 
1985 that  
the results of the conference were immediate and far reaching[,] . . . [and] 
gave the conservation movement a prestige and momentum previously 
unknown and raised it to a plane that enabled it to survive the various 
reversals it later suffered as a consequence of periodic shifts in the 
political climate.136 
 
A contemporary reporter wrote favorably of the conference in Harper’s Weekly:  
It is very rare for so much to be said that was worth hearing, recalling, 
thinking about, and acting upon as was said at the conference of 
Governors. The great value of the conference was educational. To teach 
the people to appreciate, develop, and conserve the wealth of the nation is 
a duty of enormous importance, and none too soon undertaken.137 
 
Still, such accounts of the conference and of the conservation movement at large 
recognize only Roosevelt’s energetic executive administration in “formulating, 
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implementing, and executing his wide-ranging conservation program.”138 Characteristic 
of these hagiographic accounts are references to executive actions, the creation of 
administrative agencies, and Roosevelt’s many impassioned speeches on conservation.139 
Absent from these accounts is the instrumental role of the American judiciary in applying 
innovative judicial doctrine to uphold the rights of the public to natural resources—water 
chief among them. 
Recall, for a moment, Teddy Roosevelt’s claim that America’s “public resources 
were being handled and disposed of in accordance with the small considerations of petty 
legal formalities, instead of for the large purposes of constructive development.”140 We 
now know, thanks to the outstanding historical work of legal historians, that Roosevelt’s 
characterization misrepresents the legal order of the Progressive Era. Consider as well the 
oft-overlooked fact that seven Supreme Court justices attended the 1908 Conference of 
the Governors—a decidedly meaningful and symbolic representation of the federal 
judiciary at a first-of-its-kind conservation conference. Nowhere else might the early-
twentieth-century confluence of jurisprudential progressiveness and environmental 
conservationism be more apparent. 
We should be careful, however, to malign the former president, whose 
recollection is perhaps an accurate representation of the social context in which the  
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Figure 1. Conference attendees assembled at the North Portico of the White House, May 
13, 1908. President Roosevelt is seated, front row, in the center of the group (seventh 
from the left); Vice President Fairbanks is to his left, followed in order of seniority by 
Supreme Court Justices Harlan, Brewer, White, McKenna, Holmes, Day, and Moody. 
Reproduced from Harper’s Weekly, May 30, 1908, 13.141 
 
contemporary American judiciary was perceived in less-than-ideal terms. But if we dig a 
little deeper, we find a former president unwilling to concede, in 1913 at least, that the 
American judiciary virtually created the public trust doctrine. Here, too, Roosevelt 
misrepresents the facts. Roosevelt claimed that Herbert Knox Smith (of the Inland 
Waterways Commission and National Conservation Commission) “helped to develop and 
drive into the public conscience the idea that the people ought to retain title to our natural 
resources and handle them by the leasing system.”142 As we have seen, the “idea” that the 
people ought to retain title to natural resources was already firmly established judicial 
doctrine by the end of the nineteenth century. And, just five years previously, Roosevelt 
 
141 A similar photo from a different vantage point (presumably of the official 
photographer) appears in the official proceedings with the caption “GOVERNORS IN 
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commended the “learned justice” at the opening address of this Conference of the 
Governors on a Supreme Court case that rested firmly on public trust principles.143 
Taken together, Hudson County and the Conference of the Governors mark the 
confluence of an as-yet-undeveloped undercurrent of realist judicial doctrine with the 
social and cultural currents that undergirded Progressive Era environmental 
conservationism. Just as Holmes’s opinion at once repudiated the constitutional excesses 
of Lochner era legal formalism and reconceptualized the legal status of water, so too did 
environmental conservationism repudiate the nineteenth-century notion that natural 
resources were inexhaustible and predestined for reckless human exploitation.144 Holmes, 
on a personal level, understood this basic tenet of conservation philosophy:  
Civilization is the reduction of the infinite to the finite. The realizing that 
there is so much forest, coal, etc. so much even atmosphere—and no more. 
I wonder if it might not be possible that those who are withdrawing 
nitrogen from the latter might in time be found to be doing a deadly 
thing.145 
 
Indeed, Holmes was as much a philosopher as he was a jurist, and his ability to 
encapsulate deep-seated philosophical and legal ideas into neat, succinct judicial opinions 
contributed to his celebrity and modern image as a great American jurist. His greatest 
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intellectual ability may have been his faculty for refining and synthesizing disparate ideas 
into singularly conspicuous judicial declarations, in a way that biographer Richard Posner 
likened to Shakespeare, “though on a much smaller scale. . . . He enriched where he 
borrowed; his creative imitation was a species of greatness[,] . . . [and] he helped to make 
American thought cosmopolitan and (paradoxically) to liberate American jurisprudential 
thought from slavish adherence to English models.”146 
Hudson County also shows Holmes’s distinctly versatile nature as the 
quintessential American soldier-scholar-statesman, the Yankee from Olympus.147 
Holmes, the jurist, was a common-law jurisprudent, ethical skeptic, and law-as-power 
tautologist.148 But Holmes, above all, was a philosophic realist and preeminent modernist 
legal scholar. Biographer G. Edward White formed a remarkably comprehensive 
characterization of Holmes by compiling recurring descriptors from contemporary 
reviews of Holmes’s legal treatise The Common Law, noting that “‘science,’ 
‘philosophy,’ ‘history,’ and an ‘analytic’ orientation, and ‘progress’ were mutually self-
reinforcing concepts. Holmes could serve as a historian, a scientist, and a progressively 
oriented jurist at the same time.”149 These qualities manifested in Oliver Wendell Holmes 
as the prototypical jurisprudential realist who was occasionally inclined to move with the 
currents of positive social action. Thus, among his many other contributions to the United 
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States is Holmes’s “creative” synthesis of nineteenth-century progressive philosophy and 
public trust doctrine in Hudson County—he borrowed, he enriched, and he reaffirmed the 
sanctity of the maxim salus populi suprema lex est. 
And Holmes, in 1908, must have sensed the forward momentum of environmental 
conservationism; he may even have been informed by it. And he must have known that 
the romanticist language he used in his Hudson County opinion would appeal directly to 
conservationists. Hudson County represents, then, the remarkably fortuitous confluence 
of judicial doctrine, environmental conservationism, and the beginning of a progressive 
shift in American constitutional jurisprudence. 
 
Conclusion 
Donald Pisani noted in 1987 that “Frederick Haynes Newell, first director of the 
United States Reclamation Service (now Bureau), prophesied in 1902 that ‘there must 
come a time when water must be apportioned with justice to all, and a century or more 
hence we will have it distributed not upon priority rights, but upon technical rights. . . . 
Water must ultimately be conserved in the most just manner for the general welfare of all 
citizens.’” Pisani continued: “That time did not come. The pursuit of wealth took 
precedence. Enterprise triumphed over equity.”150 Revealing an all-too-common 
tendency in legal historiography, Pisani fails to account for the significance of Hudson 
County as a progressive antecedent of legal realism and the much later formulation of 
modern environmental law. Equity and public rights, it seems, did not retreat in the 
Progressive Era.  
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Holmes was no environmental activist, and his personal views were decidedly 
more libertarian than his early court opinions might indicate. Much as Lochner era 
jurisprudence suggests the “progressiveness” of the Supreme Court at the beginning of 
the twentieth century—quite at odds with earlier interpretations of an activist court, à la 
the “persistent neo-Holmesian conceptualization of the Lochner era”—Hudson County 
reveals how the Court’s progressive ideology both drew from and influenced 
environmental conservation philosophy.151 In this sense, Hudson County may be best 
understood as a paradigmatic signpost on the road to the “settlement of 1937” and the era 
of legal realism.152 Ultimately, as Cushman explains, “in a series of responses prompted 
both by external pressures and the internal dynamics produced by this interdependence 
[of constitutional doctrines], this integrated body of [Lochner era] jurisprudence eroded 
and ultimately collapsed.”153  
And while judicial panels contended with a range of “complexity and tension” 
from a “welter of doctrine, ideology, interest group and geographic conflict, and claims 
of ‘consensus’ and ‘public interest’ . . . [as well as] ‘public rights’ theory in the light of 
political realities,” the adjudication and transformation of the public trust doctrine 
facilitated the refinement and enhanced the significance of public rights jurisprudence in 
American law.154 Where Lochner era jurisprudence generally diminished the scope of 
public interest and seemingly prioritized vested rights, “positive notions of public rights” 
experienced a correspondingly progressive expansion and affirmation.155 
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If Hudson County was ahead of its time with its reconceptualization of water 
strictly as a natural resource, it legitimated the late-twentieth-century development of an 
“emerging holistic paradigm” in environmental law and the expansion of the public trust 
doctrine “beyond the confines of navigable waters.”156 And, to borrow quote once more 
Teddy Roosevelt: “All this is simply good common sense. The underlying principle of 
conservation has been described as the application of common sense to common 
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